Book Review by and Commercial Regulation, North Carolina Journal of International Law
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 30 | Number 3 Article 4
Spring 2005
Book Review
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Journal o. and Commercial Regulation, Book Review, 30 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 733 (2004).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol30/iss3/4
Book Review
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This book review is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation:
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol30/iss3/4
The Perplexities of Promoting Religious Freedom
Through International Law: A Review of Robert
Drinan's Can God and Caesar Coexist?
Adam M. Smitht
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................................................... 733
II. Religion and International Law ............................................ 736
A. Religious Protection in the International Context:
H istory and Politics ........................................................ 736
1. The M ultilateral Treaty ............................................... 738
2. "Sectarian" Internationalism ....................................... 743
3. Religious Protection in "Customary International
Law" ................................................... 745
B. Definitional Problems: The Inconsistencies of
Religious "Freedom" ..................................................... 747
III. Monitoring and Enforcement Regimes .............. 749
A. The Commission on International Religious
Freedom ...................................................................... 750
B. The European Court of Human Rights ....................... 751
IV. Moving Toward a Judicial Solution? ................................... 754
I. Introduction
As Robert Drinan acknowledges in his book entitled Can God
and Caesar Coexist? Balancing Freedom and International Law,
the "very concept of talking about religious freedom and world
law bristles with concepts that seemingly do not cohere."' What
exactly is incongruous about connecting the two disciplines is the
subject of varying opinions that differ substantially throughout the
world. In much of the Western world, particularly the United
t Chayes Fellow, Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank Julie Gold for
her support in writing this piece.
I ROBERT DRINAN, CAN GOD AND CAESAR COEXIST? BALANCING RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004). The title is taken from a verse in the Book
of Matthew, which Drinan uses to show Biblical precedent for separating Church and
State: "[and He said to tender] to Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and to God the
things that are God's." Matthew 22:21 (King James).
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States, the source of the tension derives from an understanding
that spiritual matters are issues of individual conscience; the heavy
hand of state regulation is an unwelcome intruder.2  In the
People's Republic of China as well as in the Muslim world, where
the "mosque and government are one,",3 the issue is one of national
sovereignty. The control of religion is a matter of the essential
nature of a "Muslim nation" or a "Communist state," and, thus,
any transnational ruling on the matter assails national prerogatives.
Both sides of the debate, however, do converge on at least this
conclusion: the vague edges and sources of international law,
coupled with the nebulous contours of what "religion" entails and
what constitutes appropriate religious actions, suffice to make the
reach of international law into the religious domain dubious at
best.
Despite the lack of agreement as to rationale, the widespread
accord that religion and international law do not mix has meant
that enshrining religious freedoms in international law has taken a
secondary role to promoting other "fundamental" human rights.4
While aspects of human rights such as assertions of freedom of the
press and mandates against torture have dominated the global
human rights agenda since World War 11, there has been a basic
"absence of any real discussion on religious freedom at the world
level."5 The irony of this silence is that the horrors of World War
I-which spurred the modern human rights movement-in large
part stemmed from religion. Indeed, the slaughter of Jews,
Romani, and other ethno-religious groups led many to contend that
2 One of the first explications of the "allergy" the United States has regarding
almost any state (let alone supra-state) intrusion into religion was from Thomas Jefferson
in voicing his "Wall Theory": "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus
building a wall of separation between church and State." Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1878). The United States is far from consistent in its separation,
providing special government-sanctioned rights to religious groups (such as tax
exemption), including references to God on official state documents and products (such
as on its currency), and, at least in the case of forcing Mormons to delegitimate
polygamy, denying certain groups the right to practice religion as they see fit. See
DRINAN, supra note 1, at 48-85, 139.
3 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 113.
4 Id. at 12.
5 Id. at 13.
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"never again" started with guaranteeing the basic freedom of
religious observance.6
While Drinan's work does not purport to provide a unified
definition of what religious freedom does or does not entail, it fills
a surprisingly large void in international legal scholarship.
Though religion has been at the heart of conflicts since World War
II, ranging from the Cold War fight against "Godless
Communists" to today's "War on Terror," little has been written
on its inter-relationship with international legal regimes,7 with a
particular dearth of discussion concerning international law and
religious persecution.8 Such a brief work (200 pages) cannot hope
to fill the gap entirely, but it does offer a good beginning step for
such analysis. Drinan, a professor of law and an ordained Jesuit
priest, does a formidable job at discussing both the history of
religious freedom in the international sphere and the inherent
inconsistencies, both legal and canonical, in promoting such
freedom.
Part II of this review discusses Drinan's analysis of the various
international measures proposed since 1945 to aid religious
freedom. Part III focuses on the definitional problems inherent in
6 Id. at 14. It is these "incredible atrocities ... [that are] the fundamental reason
why the architects of the moral revolution that created the new international reign of
human rights have consistently sought to maximize the thrust and scope of religions
freedom around the world." Id.
7 There is some work on the matter, including an annual symposium at Brigham
Young University on Religion and International Law. See International Center for Law
& Religion Studies, Religion in the Public Sphere: Challenges & Opportunities,
http://www.law2.byu.edu/Law&Religion [last visited Mar. 14, 2005]. See also Derek H.
Davis, The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right: Examining the
Role of the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 2002 BYU L. REv. 217,
217. However, the majority of the literature on this subject is not on point, arguing that a
religious ethic is (or should be) the basis for international law. See, e.g., Shabtai
Rosenne, The Influence of Judaism on the Development of International Law: An
Assessment, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans
eds., 1999).
8 Drinan notes that the absence of interest is not only academic, for very few
nongovernmental organizations have been active on this issue. In the United States at
least, "[it] seems that the only ... groups vehemently protesting the denial of religious
freedom are a unit of Freedom House and Commission on Religious Freedom related to
the U.S. State Department." DRINAN, supra note 1, at 107.
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"religious freedom" before moving on to discuss two vigorous
means for monitoring and enforcing religious liberty, namely the
United States' Commission on International Religious Freedom
and the European Court of Human Rights. Part IV discusses
Drinan's solution for religious persecution-the establishment of a
U.N. backed religious tribunal to rule on matters such as the rights
of homosexuals, women, and religious minorities. It is here that
Drinan's analysis proves unpersuasive. Drinan makes little
attempt to provide support for his tribunal proposal, and the
questionable recent history of tribunals in addressing religious
freedoms-some of which he cites-leads an observer to question
whether the problem of religious persecution can be best "solved"
via judicial means.
II. Religion and International Law
A. Religious Protection in the International Context: History
and Politics
Most commentators point to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia as
the start of the modem era of international law. It was in that
document that the primary building block of contemporary
international law-the "inviolability" of national sovereignty-
was first explicated and widely embraced. 9 Though it does not
profess to be a "religious" document, negotiations leading to
Westphalia were held to end a particularly gruesome chapter of the
"Wars of Religion" which were fought following the Protestant
reformation.' ° Further, the Treaty called for a "Christian and
Universal Peace," and, while not guaranteeing rights to a true
diversity of religious groups, it demanded that Protestants and
Catholics be protected when they were minorities in signatory
states." This limited protection afforded to religious minorities
9 Some commentators have argued, however, that "[it] is hard to surmise from
[reading the Treaty] . . . any general principle of 'sovereignty. . .' [Rather] the compact
represented the passing of some power from the emperor with his claim of holy
predominance, to many kings and lords who then treasured their own local
predominance. As time passed, this developed into notions of the absolute right of the
sovereign, and what we call 'Westphalian sovereignty."' John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-
Modem: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 786 (2003).
10 Id.
11 Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and
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was a revolutionary advance; in pre-Enlightenment Europe,
distinctions between church and state were all but unknown,' 2 and
religious heterogeneity was viewed as a direct affront to state
control. Demanding not only tolerance but also protection for
religious minorities directly countered the larger provision of
seemingly unchallengeable national sovereignty.' 3
Despite this advance, in the long term, it was Westphalian
sovereignty-not religious protections-that proved resilient. The
continuation of religious persecution in the centuries following
Westphalia proved that it would be difficult "to effectively secure
the enforcement of any international legal guarantees, whether in
treaty or custom, to protect religious diversity."'
14
Westphalian sovereignty, even if never uniformly and
completely respected, proved such a barrier to the growth of
religious protections primarily because of where it drew the limits
of international law. 5 Freedom of religious practice, especially in
contravention to a governing ruler's wishes, is a right clearly
anchored in the individual. International law, however, could not
reach down into the state to empower individuals, so long as
Westphalia prevented the piercing of the "veil of the state."' 6
It took the Holocaust and subsequent humanitarian disasters
for much of the international community finally to begin to loosen
the grip of Westphalian sovereignty and enter a world in which
international law extended beyond the reach of states.'7 Just as
Westphalian sovereignty was never absolute, however, the
breakdown of Westphalia has similarly proceeded unevenly,
advancing at different rates depending upon the state and issues at
Their Respective Allies, Oct. 24, 1648 (also known as The Treaty of Westphalia),
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2005) (This treaty is also known as the Treaty of Westphalia).
12 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 98 (referencing "actions of Christendom" such as the
Crusades and the Inquisition).
13 Id.
14 Mark W. Janis, Religion and International Law, Americafl Society of
International Law Insights (2002), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh93.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See DRINAN, supra note 1, at 191-93.
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hand. 8 In many cases, it is in the area of religious liberties that
states continue to hold fast to sovereign prerogatives "granted" to
them in trust at Westphalia.' 9
Even so, it is irrefutable that recent pronouncements and
actions of the international community have continued to chip
away at Westphalian immutability.20 Indeed, the three sets of
post-World War II legal instruments that Drinan points to as
providing some international legal support for individual religious
liberty can be seen as direct affronts to 17th century-style
sovereignty. The author discusses multilateral treaties, "sectarian"
international statements, and customary international law as tools
by which individuals have been granted internationally-prescribed
rights to religious freedom. It is the weakness inherent in each of
these tools, combined with the difficulty of defining "religious
liberty" itself that has nonetheless left the promise of such freedom
illusory in much of the world.
1. The Multilateral Treaty
The end of World War II saw the dawn of what appeared to be
an ecumenical, if not atheist, international arena. The far-reaching
multilateral agreements into which states increasingly entered
seemingly provided robust protection for the free exercise of
religion, separating spirituality from statecraft.
The apparently irreligious United Nations has been responsible
for almost all of these "mega-treaties." Yet, the two documents
which form the foundation of almost all subsequent agreements-
the United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter)2' and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 2 -- manifest ambiguous
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 For example, the "Annan Doctrine," promulgated by the United Nations
Secretary-General, provides justification for intervention into the internal affairs of
member states "to prevent or arrest conflict, even when perpetrated against a state's own
people." Adam M. Smith, From Democracy to Conflict: The UN's Search for Peace and
Security, 34 SECuRITY DIALOGUE 3, 358 (2003).
21 U.N. CHARTER, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter (last visited Feb.
21, 2005).
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights], available
at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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relationships with religion. Drinan claims that the works contain a
"vague deism, '' 23 with the existence of some divine presence an
essential premise as to both.24
Though the U.N. Charter states that one of the purposes of the
organization is "promoting and encouraging respect of human
rights and.., fundamental freedoms ... without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion .. ,25 the Charter has rarely been
used to further religious liberties.26 The UDHR has proven a
significantly stronger affirmation of the "right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion" 27and also provides "parents the
right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their
children," a clause often used to imply the protection of religious-
based education.28
The weakness of UDHR comes both from the intricacies of
international law and from drafting provisions that allow easy
derogation. Concerning the former, the key limit to the UDHR is
the fact that it is merely a "declaration." Such an instrument,
while more legally persuasive than "principles" 29  or
"recommendations,"3 ° is legally inferior to a binding covenant.31
23 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 116. As discussed below, neither document adequately
allows for atheism or agnosticism.
24 Id.
25 See UN CHARTER, supra note 21, art, 1. Drinan argues that the Charter's
"authors ... made it clear that the protection of religious freedom was the central
purpose of the United Nations." DRINAN, supra note 1, at 31.
26 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that the mention of religious freedom in
Article 2 of the UN Charter is a "slight exception" to the Charter's non-assertion of
divine origin of human rights).
27 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 18.
28 Id. art. 26.3 See also DRINAN, supra note 1, at 122. Drinan notes that the words
contained in the article "were the result of compromises, accommodations, and the
strong feelings of parents, especially religious ones, that they should have the some right
to decide the kind of schooling that their children would receive." Id.
29 See, e.g., PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/princeton.htmI (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
30 See, e.g., THE HAGUE RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE EDUCATION RIGHTS
OF NATIONAL MINORITIES AND EXPLANATORY NOTE, October 1996, available at
http://www l.umn.edu/humanrts/osce/basics/hague- 1996.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
Further, while many of the other protections accorded in UDHR
have since been incorporated into binding covenants, the full
panoply of religious protections have never attained more than
"declaratory" status.32 Consequently, accountability for a state's
abuse of the religious rights of its citizens is legally one step below
its accountability for violations of their political and economic
rights."
The drafting loophole, through which many signatory
countries manage to follow simultaneously the declaration's edicts
while oppressing religious freedom, comes in its proscribed
exceptions to the protection of rights:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject... to such limitations as are determined by law...
for... meeting the just requirements of morality, public order
and... general welfare ....
In practice, this "limited" exception has often swallowed
underlying protections, giving "legal" cover to states that do not
wish to protect religious liberties.35
An additional failure in subsequent agreements purporting to
protect religious freedom is the absence of certain rights that once
were thought necessary for real practice of such liberties. The key
right absent in both the Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief,36 and the legally more substantial International Covenant
Regulation).
31 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 43.
32 Id. at 213.
33 Id. at 213-214. Drinan notes that national sovereignty still takes priority over the
promotion of international religious freedoms such that "national leaders... will argue
strenuously that a sovereign nation has the right to prohibit any activity related to
religion that, in the eyes or in the imagination of reasonable leaders, could be threatening
to the independence or welfare of the nation." Id.
34 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 29, §2.
35 See, e.g., DRINAN, supra note 1, at 184. Drinan notes that, despite the
Declaration of Religious Freedom, many Muslim nations still adhere to the strong
Islamic principle that no person has a right to change his or her religion. Id.
36 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55. U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc A/36/51 (1982).
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on Civil and Political Rights 37 (ICCPR), is the right to change
religions or to cease believing altogether. While the right is
mentioned in the UDHR, any allowance for conversion, let alone
for becoming an atheist or agnostic, is absent from these two
instruments.38
The rationale behind this change lies in the politics of the
United Nations, and, in particular, the large increase in the number
of Islamic member states who have been most averse to allowing
religious change. When the UDHR was passed in 1948, there
were only six Islamic states in the United Nations; now there are
thirty-five,39 which are joined by a further twenty-one states in the
umbrella Organization of Islamic Conferences.4 °
Nevertheless, Drinan claims that the ICCPR remains a
potentially powerful bulwark against religious oppression.41
"Conventions," as opposed to declarations and other agreements,
have usually created monitoring bodies which demand regular
reports from signatories on the status of implementation of the
Convention's guarantees.42 The ICCPR's monitoring agent, the
37 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), [hereinafter Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights] available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b4ccprpl.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
38 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 34, 248.
39 Id. at 43. Despite their membership in the OIC and the fact that many Islamic
countries abstained from the final vote of approval for the UDHR, Drinan notes that
Islamic nations are "deeply divided over the question of religious freedom," with the
only "consensus among Muslim nations that [a] ... secular state can embrace the full
exercise of the rights and duties that derive from the Koran." Id. at 3.
40 The Organization of Islamic Conference includes states that are not uniformly
Islamic, such as Lebanon, Uganda and Nigeria. See General Activities of the OIC
available at http://www.oic-oci.org/ (last visited March 14, 2005).
41 See id. at 34-36. Under the ICCPR, "all forms of coercion [based upon religion]
are barred, and restrictions on religious freedom are permitted only if they are necessary
to protect public safety, order, health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others." Id. at 34.
42 See, Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights: Should There be an International Complaints Mechanism to
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462
(2004).
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Human Rights Committee, holds frequent meetings in which the
body assesses the compliance of signatory states.43 One final right
under the ICCPR is accorded to citizens of those states who have
ratified the "First Optional Protocol" to the convention. This
protocol addresses what Drinan believes is a prime oversight in the
global protection of religion: the absence of standing for
individuals to press claims against their states for wrongs
committed in contravention to their treaty obligations.' Article
One of the Optional Protocol mandates that a State Party:
"[Recognize] the competence of the [Human Rights] Committee to
receive and consider communications from individuals subject to
its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State
Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.,
45
Despite this significant allowance, the weaknesses of ICCPR,
as well as the entire multilateral religious liberties protection
regime, remain serious. Countries must ratify the Option Protocol
for individuals to be granted standing, a privilege presently
enjoyed by only a minority of the world's population,46 and
oppressed individuals must exhaust all available domestic
remedies before resort to the Committee.47  Additionally, even in
Optional Protocol One signatories, the issue of enforcement
remains. While the "Committee can recommend specific remedies
43 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, SESSIONS OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/
hrc/hrcs.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
44 See, e.g., DRINAN, supra note 1, at 5-7 (discussing the creation of an
international legal tribunal to hear and enforce the guarantees of religious freedom).
45 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 37.
46 Though 104 states have signed the protocol, many of the most populous states in
the world have not: Peoples Republic of China, India, Indonesia, the United States, the
United Kingdom, Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh. See Status of Ratifications of the
Principal International Human Rights Treaties, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, June 9, 2004 [hereinafter ICCPR Ratifications],
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). Moreover,
even the fact that a state is a signatory may overstate the real protection provided by the
Optional Protocol, as many countries have appended various reservations or declarations
to their ratifications of the protocol greatly limiting the domestic legal impact of any
adverse ruling. Id.
47 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 37, art. 2.
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for victims ... it has little leverage to ensure that states implement
these recommendations."48 The result, according to Drinan, is that
there have been no "overwhelming victories for religious
freedoms.., in the U.N. Human Rights Committee," and there
continues to be an absence of "any [effective] laws offering
victims of... religious intolerance injunctive or compensatory
relief."4
9
2. "Sectarian" Internationalism
Given the global pervasiveness of organized religion and the
fact that some religious entities favored by secular authorities have
often been accorded a wide berth of autonomy, 50 protection of
religious liberties could theoretically be promoted by the faiths
themselves. History indicates, however, that this has not in fact
occurred. Rather, the "special" place accorded certain religions in
various states has resulted in widespread suppression of minority
believers. Indeed, "intolerance is taught not by religion but by
political leaders who use religion for their own purposes."'" The
obligations felt by some states to exalt the "true faith" allowed
favored religions to be "as zealous as they wanted to be without
concern for other religions." 2
Drinan offers a fascinating analysis of one effort to change this
mold, examining the history and political impact of the Second
Vatican Council (Vatican II) in 1965. Altering a hitherto
fundamental tenet of Catholicism, Rome issued a document
claiming inter alia: "Religious acts ... transcend the order of
48 Beth Van Schaak, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42
HARV. INT'L L.J. 141, 162 (2001). Further, due in large measure to the limitations of the
Committee, there has been a lack of enthusiasm on behalf of many citizens from actually
filing complaints with the Committee. This may also indicate some structural difficulties
that effectively prevent oppressed people from filing such complaints despite their legal
potential. See Dennis & Stewart, supra note 41, at 508.
49 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 37.
50 Id. at 94.
51 Id. at 186. For example, the Koran states: "There must be no coercion in matters
of faith." Id. It further states that religious diversity should be promoted "unto you, your
moral law, and unto me, mine." Id. (quoting Koran 2:256, 109:6).
52 Id. at 100, 110.
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terrestrial and temporal affairs. Government, therefore, ought...
to take account of the religious life of the people .... However, it
would clearly transgress the limits set to its power were it to
"513pressure to direct or inhibit acts that are religious ....
The Vatican thus set out a broad policy demanding both
separation between church and state and firm support for religious
freedom. The limitations of Vatican II, ignored by Drinan, are
significant, however. First, while the Vatican may have foregone
its long-held dictum that "error" had no rights,54 it nonetheless
held fast to a traditional model of faith.55 Governments were
charged to "show favor"56 to religion. While no specific religion
is mentioned, the language of Vatican II strongly suggests that
"religion" implies those faiths based on fundamental tenets of the
Abrahamic religions, such as monotheism.57 Even if polytheism is
protected under the instrument, Vatican II, like so many of the UN
agreements discussed above, does not provide any political space
for non-believers.58
An additional limitation is self evident: while the Vatican is a
persuasive authority in many nations, its words have considerably
less impact in the majority of the world.59 While Vatican II, and a
similarly wide-ranging document issued from the World Council
of Churches,6" ought not to be discounted, it would be a mistake to
overvalue the power these Christian documents have, even on state
behavior in the "Christian" West, let alone the plight of religious
minorities throughout the Muslim world and in states like the
People's Republic of China.6'
53 The Vatican, Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) on the
Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters
Religious Promulgated by his Holiness Pope Paul VI, Dec. 7, 1965, at http://www.
vatican.va/archive/histcouncils/iivatican-council/documents/vat-iideclI_19651207
dignitatis-humanaeen.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
54 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 100. The implication is that "untrue" faiths were
undeserving of any protection. Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 101.
57 The Vatican, supra note 52.
58 Id.
59 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 165, 182.
60 Id. at 105.
61 See id. at 165 (noting that according to U.S. State Department Reports, China is,
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3. Religious Protection in "Customary International
Law"
A final existing source of religious protection stems from
Customary International Law (CIL). Drinan writes that some of
the guarantees sought via a more robust international legal
protection of religious freedom may have already moved into the
realm of CIL.62 This "de facto" international law develops when
states follow certain "practices generally and consistently out of a
sense of legal obligation. 63  By this argument, the consistent
practice of many states in protecting religious freedoms means that
the world community has adopted religious liberty as a universal
norm. This implies that those to whom religious freedom is
denied have some legal authority with which to demand redress.
In many respects, this is Drinan's primary thesis: "religious
freedom has been elevated to the status of Customary International
Law .... "64
Despite Drinan's contention, the very existence of CIL, even
apart from its content, has proven controversial. Not only are
there some who claim that the existence of CIL is contrary to the
basic premise of international law, by binding states who have not
necessarily consented to be, there remains significant uncertainty
as to what "consistent" practice entails. In particular, there are
inconsistent examples regarding how long an act must be practiced
before it is accorded CIL status.
65
year after year, "unremittingly hostile to Christians and other Religious groups"); see
also id. at 182 (stating that "[m]any Islamic nations have... asserted flatly and
repeatedly that they will not yield to any norm of religious freedom that violates what
they perceive to be an obligation derived from the teachings of the Prophet").
62 See Id. at 185
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(2) (1986). Typically, actors that are either not directly elected, or elected at all-
such as courts, academics, and non-governmental organizations-determine whether
norms have met the basic requirements of "general practice" and "sense of legal
obligation" (opiniojuris). Id.
64 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 185.
65 Some contend that customary international law can develop "instantly" with the
unanimous ratification of a treaty. George M. Berrisch, The Establishment of New Law
Through Subsequent Practice in GATT, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497, 502-03
(1991). Others maintain that "instant" customary international law has formed around
human rights instruments. International and domestic judicial opinion is also split on the
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CIL is consequently a weak place from which to gain any
robust protection of religious practice. Even if it were recognized
that CIL has developed mandating protections, there are three fatal
flaws in relying on CIL. First, following Article 38 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, CIL cannot derive from
treaties to which a party is not a member.66 That is, as religious
protections are provided in various treaties, states not party to
them cannot be made subject to their obligations even if the
obligations have subsequently become CIL.
Second, even if CIL were found, those promoting religious
freedom would run into the "Persistent Objector" problem. This
rule "provides that if a state objects to the establishment of a norm
while it is becoming law and persistently objects up to the present,
it is exempt from that norm., 67 It would be hard to claim that the
states most often cited for religious oppression have not
persistently objected to unfettered freedom of faith. While some
states, such as Saudi Arabia, have simply refused to accede to any
conventions guaranteeing such liberties, others have couched their
acceptance of certain provisions within constraints that tacitly
permit religious oppression, especially the oppression of minority
faiths.68 Indeed, Article 10 of the 1990 Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam limits the right to convert from Islam, and
matter. For example, in Paquete Habana, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a custom
needed centuries to develop. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). However, in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases the International Court of Justice ruled that a custom could
develop within a few years. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 74; See Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice In
a Divided World, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THEORY 513, 532 (R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M.
Johnston eds., 1983).
66 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 38, T.S. No.
58, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 331.
67 See David Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH.
L. REv. 957, 957 (1986); Ted L. Stein, The Approach of a. Different Drummer: The
Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 457, 457
(1985); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 413, 434, 437 (1983). But see Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector
Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 21
(1985).
68 For example, Egypt explicitly ratified the ICCPR within the constraints
permitted under Shari'a (the Muslim Code of Law), while other states inserted
substantive reservations to their ratification. See ICCPR Ratifications, supra note 45.
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Articles 24 and 25 make it clear that all rights guaranteed are
subject to limitations and interpretation under Shari'a.69
Finally, even if a religious dissident is legally correct in her
assertion of the impermissibility of the persecution she faces, it is
not clear to whom she would make such a claim. Absent Optional
Protocol One, individuals in the majority of the world simply have
no standing to assert such rights.
B. Definitional Problems: The Inconsistencies of Religious
"Freedom"
Drinan makes clear that the existence of Shari'a and religious
law derived from other faiths creates inherent semantic
confusion.7" The author notes that before one can even
contemplate the contours of the "freedom" one must first define
"religion." The term has proven unamenable to definition, and
remains essentially "undefined as a matter of international law."71
Establishing a coherent definition of "religion" is more than
academic. Ascribing a group as a "religion," as opposed to a
"cult" or a "sect" can often mean the difference between
governmental suppression and support.72
This is especially clear in the European context where there
has arisen a significant debate concerning "cults,"73 which are
almost universally legally disdained, in contrast to "religions"
which often receive official state backing. An example of the
impact of such equivocation can be seen in the German and
Belgian governments' treatment of Scientology. While both states
have made their animosity towards the "cult" of Scientology clear,
they have left the distinction between "cult" and "religion" rather
vague.74 Similar government disdain for "cults" and "sects" can
69 See The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 August 1990,
http://www.humanrights.harvard.edu/documents/regionaldocs/cairo-dec.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005).
70 See DRINAN, supra note 1, at 77.
71 T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of "Religion" in
International Law, 16 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 190 (2003).
72 Id. at 196.
73 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 73.
74 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2004 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, Denouncing Certain Religions by Affiliating Them with
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be seen in Spain and France.75
The nature of freedom demanded by religious "liberty" has
incurred contrasting interpretations long before the post-World
War II human rights debates. Though other shades of
interpretation exist, a significant portion of the difficulties related
to religious freedom stem from unclear parameters for allowing
"positive" and "negative" liberties.76
How much positive freedom does true religious liberty
demand? At the extremes of religious practice, such as Sati,7
female genital mutilation and nihilistic interpretations of Jihad, the
matter may seem elementary. Religious freedom surely cannot
include the allowance of such acts. Even with these extreme
examples, however, and perhaps more so in regard to more
moderate acts, the issue can be much more complex. For example,
Drinan argues that some religions have a well-developed
martyrdom myth.78 According to some interpretations of the New
Testament, Christians are supposed to suffer for their faith.79 How
much suffering should international law allow such faiths to
endure? Further, the author makes the contentious argument that
it may be inherent in some religions to express animus to other
faiths. For example, he claims that there is "something almost
inherent in Christianity that promotes anti-Judaism."80 If this is
Dangerous "Cults" or "Sects" (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/ (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
75 See John T. S. Madeley, European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State
Religious Neutrality, 1 W. EUR. POL 1, 26 (2003).
76 See ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY.
Generally speaking, "positive liberty" refers to the freedom to act while "negative
liberty" refers to the freedom to be left alone. Id.
77 "Sati" is the Hindu practice of burning a husband's widow on his funeral pyre.
For debates on this issue, see Donna Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom:
Toward a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 795, 796
(1992).
78 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 200. "Persons of faith may claim that God ordains the
persecution of his own people." Id.
79 See, e.g., 2 Timothy 2:12: "[I]f we suffer, we shall also reign with Him" and 1
Peter 4:12-14: "Beloved, do not be surprised at the fiery ordeal which comes upon you
to prove you, as though something strange were happening to you. But rejoice in so far
as you share Christ's sufferings, that you may also rejoice and be glad when His glory is
revealed."
80 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 194.
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the case, what does a demand for religious freedom entail for both
Christians and Jews?
Another example of such conflicting requirements comes in
the treatment by religions of various sub-groups, women and
homosexuals in particular. Should religious freedom to force
women into a subservient position be a part of a religious liberty?
What if a practice within a religion directly contravenes
conventions to which a state is party? Drinan points again to
Catholicism and asks whether the Church's refusal to ordain
women-arguably in direct conflict with Article 2 of the
Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women---could
be maintained. 81 The Convention demands that signatory states
"undertake to... take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organization or
enterprise.,8 2 With this in mind, would true religious freedom in
signatory countries mandate that Catholics ordain women?
Negative liberty is similarly complex. The primary aspect in
this regard is whether allowing freedom of religion would also
entail freedom from religion. Proselytism and blasphemy are very
sensitive subjects, and it is far from clear how true religious
liberties can be protected for both those whose faith demands them
to "spread the word" and those for whom receiving missionaries
contravenes their own beliefs.83
III. Monitoring and Enforcement Regimes
While effective enforcement of religion has been hindered by
both the legal and definitional difficulties discussed above, Drinan
points to two regimes that have managed to develop some
81 This article asks state parties to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise." Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 2, para. e. Dec.
1979, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
82 Id.
83 Cf. Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in
International Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251 (1999) and John Witte, Jr. Ray
Rushton Distinguished Lecturer Series: A Primer on the Rights and Wrongs of
Proselytism, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 619 (2000/2001). See also Drinan, supra note 1, at 10-
11,81.
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consistency in interpretation and even some limited enforcement
powers: the United States government's Commission on
International Religious Freedom and the Council of Europe's
European Convention on Human Rights, enforced by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).84
A. The Commission on International Religious Freedom
With the 1998 passage of the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA) 85 and the consequent creation of the Commission on
International Religious Freedom charged with annually reporting
the global state of religious freedoms, the United States has "in
essence proclaimed to the world that it is the self-appointed
defender of religious freedom in 190 nations. 86  As such, the
United States has been subjected to significant criticism that the
Commission is another example of unwarranted U.S.
unilateralism. 87  While some of the criticism is based on a
misconception of the IRFA, other critics correctly point out that
the Act avoids any of the above-mentioned definitional difficulties
and nuance innate in "religious freedom" by simply adopting
America's uniquely "privatized" definition of the concept.88 Thus,
for the authors of the report, almost any state involvement in
religion is anathema to the American conception of free practice
89
and consequently would provide cause for the Commission to
deem a country "unfree"-a recognition regularly accorded to a
significant plurality of the world's nations.9
Though IRFA has consistently applied its definition and has
tracked the ebb and flow of religious freedom since its inception, it
is not clear that the Act has resulted in any actual changes in
84 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 13, 18.
85 22 U.S.C.A. § 6401, et seq. (2004).
86 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 77.
87 Id.
88 See generally id, 69-77 (discussing the difficulties inherent in unilateral actions
taken towards promoting religious freedom.)
89 Id. at 69. In particular, the United States disdains requirements for religious
groups to register with the State under the assumption that such laws are easily and
frequently abused to limit minority religions. Id.
90 See U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, supra note 73.
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religious liberty for those citizens living in unfree states.9 When a
country is found in breach of religious freedom, the IRFA
provides the President with a menu of fifteen punitive options with
which to respond.9 2 Unfortunately, as many of these options can
be carried out surreptitiously, it is difficult to measure what, if any,
impact has resulted from U.S. policy.9 3
B. The European Court of Human Rights
Formed with the merging of the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights
91 Id.
92 See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6445(a). Presidential actions are limited to: (1) a private
demarche, (2) an official public demarche, (3) a public condemnation, (4) a public
condemnation within one or more multilateral fora, (5) the delay or cancellation of one
or more scientific exchanges, (6) the delay or cancellation of one or more cultural
exchanges, (7) the denial of one or more working, official, or state visits, (8) the delay or
cancellation of one or more working, official, or state visits, (9) the withdrawal,
limitation, or suspension of United States development assistance in accordance with
section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, (10) directing the Export-Import
Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or the Trade
and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of any (or a specified number of)
guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit, or participations in the extension of credit
with respect to the specific government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or
determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402,
(11) the withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in
accordance with section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, (12) consistent
with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, directing the
United States executive directors of international financial institutions to oppose and
vote against loans primarily benefiting the specific foreign government, agency,
instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for
violations under section 401 or 402, (13) ordering the heads of the appropriate United
States agencies not to issue any (or a specified number of) specific licenses, and not to
grant any other specific authority (or a specified number of authorities), to export any
goods or technology to the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or
official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under
section 401 or 402 under [various export control statutes], (14) prohibiting any United
States financial institution from making loans or providing credits totaling more than
$10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the specific foreign government, agency,
instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for
violations under section 401 or 402, (15) prohibiting the United States Government from
procuring, or entering into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services
from the foreign government, entities, or officials found or determined by the President
to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402. Id.
93 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 63.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
(ECHR) is the most developed multinational judicial body
protecting religious freedoms. 94 Though religious claims were
hindered due to procedural encumbrances prior to reforms in 1998,
since seen tens of thousands of applications made to the body. 95
Uniquely, individuals have standing before the court and have
frequently asserted their rights under Article Nine of the European
Convention on Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion; [including] the right to change
his religion ... and manifest his religion ... in worship, teaching,
practice and observance."96
The impact of ECHR rulings is significant given the decision
of many states to be bound by the Strasbourg court on such
issues.9 7 Though stronger than any other multinational body, the
ECHR's ability to fully protect religious freedoms in the face of
member state oppression is far from absolute.98  Much like the
United Nations treaties mentioned above, a state's protection of its
citizens' religious freedom is derogable in the face of threats to
law or to protect "public order, health or morals.. . ."99 Given the
close relationship many profess between their religious beliefs and
their moral bearings, the limitation on religious liberty in order to
protect "public morals" can be significant.
Moreover, for various reasons, the ECHR (along with most
other bodies of the European Council and Union) has developed a
philosophy of subsidiarity, whereby it grants significant deference
to local authorities on many matters.'00 This has resulted in the
94 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Protocol 11, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/
webConvenENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter European Convention].
95 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 87.
96 See European Convention, supra note 93, art. 9.
97 The United Kingdom is a notable example of this trend. See DRINAN, supra note
1, at 87. In all, about "half of the signatories to the Convention have incorporated the
treaty into domestic law... The remaining states [give] ... effect to. .. judgments of
the ECHR [by] agreeing to introduce legislative amendments, reopen judicial
proceedings, grant administrative remedies, and pay monetary damages to individuals
whose treaty rights have been violated." Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International
Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REv 429, 498 (2003).
98 See DRINAN, supra note I at 87-89.
99 See European Convention, supra note 93, art. 9.
100 See Carol Harlow, Voices of Difference in a Plural Community, 50 AM. J. COMP.
L. 339, 367 (2002); see also Dennis J. Edwards, Fearing Federalism's Failure:
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ECHR developing the jurisprudential doctrine of "margin of
appreciation,''. demanding clear abuses by member states before
it intervenes. 10 2 Consequently, despite the number of petitions the
court has received, there have been few cases in which the court
has held that state limits on religious freedom were in
contravention of state obligations under the European Convention.
In particular, the ECHR has come to recognize religious liberties
in a very narrow frame, holding states' actions illegal only if they
limit personal religious acts and only if those acts are compelled
by religious belief.'03
Thus, in Kahn v United Kingdom, °4 the conviction of a man
for marrying an underage girl without her parents' consent was
upheld. Though the marriage was legal from the point of view of
Shari'a, the court nevertheless found him guilty because Islamic
law only allows such marriages rather than requires them.0 5
Similarly, in X v. Austria,10 6 the state was permitted to stop a
"Moonie Sect" from setting up a legal association, and in X v.
United Kingdom,10 7 the state was allowed to prohibit a Buddhist
prisoner from sending letters to a Buddhist magazine, because
neither act was necessary to the practice of either faith.0 8
Subsidiarity in the European Union, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 537, 543 (1996).
101 See Douglas L. Donahue, Autonomy, Self-Governance and the Margin of
Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights,
15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 391, 450 (2001); Thomas W. Stone, Margin of Appreciation
Gone Awry: The European Court of Human Rights' Implicit Use of the Precautionary
Principle in Frette v. France to Backtrack on Protection from Discrimination on the
Basis of Sexual Orientation, 3 CONN. PUB. INT'L L. J. 271, 277 (2003), at
http://www.law.uconn.edu/joumals/cpilj/Edition-ContentsNolumeIII/Stone.doc.
102 Id.
103 See Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 5, 1919 (1978). See generally CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 111-24 (2001) (providing
analysis of the "Arrowsmith Necessity Test").
104 Kahn v. United Kingdom, 194 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
105 See generally MAJMA' AL-BUHUTH AL-ISLAMIYAH, MARRIAGE IN ISLAMIC LAW
(1998) (discussing the requirements for marriage under Islamic Law); see also JOSEPH
SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 161 (1964).
106 X v. Austria, 26 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 89 (1981).
107 X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5422/72, Dec. 20, 1974, 1 D.R. 41.
108 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 92.
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More than employing a narrow interpretation of religious
freedom, the ECHR has, at times, been inordinately hostile to
religious dissenters claiming violations of their rights. For
example, a Jehovah's Witness was arrested and subsequently
convicted for violating the Greek constitution's ban onproselytizing.109 In upholding the verdict, Judge Valticos
described the defendant as "a hard-bitten adept of proselytism, a
specialist in conversion, a martyr of the criminal courts."" In
light of such rulings and the continuing deference the ECHR has
shown to member state actions limiting religious liberty, Drinan
concludes his examination with a dire lament:
One of the major reasons for the creation of the
ECHR was... to establish a legal framework that
would prevent religious groups from being
persecuted as the Jews were under Hitler .... [I]t is
not entirely clear that the ECHR would be able to
accomplish that mission if European leaders [today]
began to repeat the mistakes of the Third Reich."'
IV. Moving Toward a Judicial Solution?
Drinan's solution, mentioned throughout his book, is that an
effective salve to religious persecution would be the establishment
of a U.N.-backed multinational tribunal on religious issues. Given
the author's concerns for the ECHR's inability to effectively
counter religious oppression, this prescription is puzzling." 2 If the
most sophisticated existing judicial body concerned with the
matter has had such questionable success, why does Drinan
believe that a U.N.-backed body would be more effective?
Indeed, Drinan's presumption that the U.N. could "solve" this
problem represents a monolithic view of the source of
international law and is out of line with recent moves away from
U.N. structures when addressing issues of justice.'13
109 GREECE CONST. art. 13(2), reprinted in Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 11 (1993).
110 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 431 (1993) (Valticos, J.,
dissenting).
111 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 95.
112 The author himself admits that it "may seem quixotic." Id. at 5.
113 Most notable in this regard is the 2004 establishment of the International
Criminal Court, an entity outside the United Nations family. See "RELATIONSHIP WITH
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Moreover, Drinan does not address the significant political and
logistical hurdles with a U.N. tribunal dedicated to freedom of
religion issues. Regarding politics, as the ICC has found, there
remains substantial global reluctance for states to submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of a non-national judiciary. 14 If it is
true that the ICCPR provides for only watered-down religious
freedoms because of the political difficulty of "tangling with
Muslim states," it seems that such difficulties would be
exacerbated in the face a court that would presumably make
binding decisions on such matters.
Even without these political difficulties, the idea of an
international religious tribunal is hobbled by unaddressed
logistical problems. Apart from the determination of who would
sit on such a court, there is a significant problem regarding
compliance. International tribunals today, such as the U.N.'s
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were
created under Chapter VII Security Council resolutions and are
thus legally binding courts on all U.N. member states.1"5 Added to
this legitimacy is a host of secondary Security Council resolutions,
also passed under Chapter VII, demanding that UN member states
cooperate fully with the tribunals.'16 However, even with this
legal force, the courts have received only marginal cooperation
from states, with serious impacts on the quality of justice
THE UNITED NATIONS," INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION, in
THE ICC AT A GLANCE, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ataglance/whatistheicc/
history.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
114 Indeed, the international character of the "International" Criminal Court is
severely tested by the fact that of the 191 member states of the United Nations, only 97
have agreed to even partial jurisdiction of the court. See Coalition for the Int'l Criminal
Court, CICC: Home Page, at http://www.iccnow.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
115 The ICTY was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 808 of
February 22, 1993. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808 (1993). The ICTR was created by United Nations Security Council
Resolution 955 of November 8, 1994. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
116 Resolution 1534 is the latest of many Security Council pronouncements that
reiterate calls for states to cooperate with both the ICTR and ICTY. United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1534 of Mar. 26, 2004. S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. SCOR, 59th
Sess., 4935th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (2004).
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delivered. 17
Drinan also leaves the exact use of such a tribunal vague, and
the few concrete examples of where he sees its operation prove
perplexing. For instance, he claims that if a U.N. tribunal on
religious freedom existed, "its members would now be holding
hearings to help the world understand the source and meaning of
the rage that prompted the savage attacks on the United States."
' 18
To argue that a "religious" body is the correct place to frame, let
alone adjudicate such issues, seems offensive to the vast majority
of Muslims who argue that there is nothing in Islam that could
possibly provide a basis for the terrorist attacks. Issues of political
and economic oppression, combined with limits on various other
freedoms, seem the more likely culprits for spurring such
attacks-matters that are more appropriately addressed via other
fora.
An additional concern of such a court would be whether it
would effectively protect local prerogatives. The protection of
religious freedoms does not mean an end to diversity, but there is
an unclear line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of
subsidiarity. The anxiety of a court's ability to make just rulings
(let alone enforce them) has been deemed the "Strasbourg
Effect."" 9  This phenomenon is the gradual homogenizing of
jurisprudence emanating from international tribunals. This raises
serious concerns of legitimacy, while potentially denying national
identity. This too would make compliance even more difficult.
Given the difficulties of definition and the sensitivities on the
matter, perhaps the better option would be not to develop a
specific religious-based tribunal or even religious-freedom-
enhancing jurisprudence. It may be more effective and palatable
117 For instance, in the ICTY case Prosecutor v. Blaskic, the inability of the
prosecutor to gain access to the state archives of Croatia-an impossibility while
President Franjo Tudjman presided over the country-led to a trial that did not include
significant material documents. The result was a greatly extended appellate procedure,
and a final reduction in sentencing from forty-five to eight years after many of the
documents finally came to light. See Press Release, ICTY, Appeals Chamber Judgment
in the Case of Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic (July, 29, 2004), available at http://www.
un.org/icty/cases/jugemindex-e.htm.
118 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 84.
119 Michael C. Dorf, The International Influence on the Supreme Court Decision on
Executions, FINDLAw FORUM (June 19, 2002), at http://us.cnn.com/2002/LAW/06/
columns/fl.dorf.exec.retarded.06.28/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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to recognize that all too often instances of religious oppression fit
into more universally-agreed-upon violations and should be so
addressed. To take an extreme example, under this model the
Holocaust would be deemed "legally" wrong not because it
consisted of arbitrary attacks on religious minorities, but because
of the attacks themselves. In such case, religion would not
provide a separate basis for legal complaint. 120  Admittedly,
folding religion into other claims is not a completely satisfying
response. It is akin to recent indictments in the ICTY and ICTR
that have included the charge of rape within the larger crime of
torture, much to the consternation of many who want to see rape
listed on par with larger crimes. 121 Still, if the option is either to
ignore the rape charge (or the religion charge) or to include it in an
imperfect manner, surely the latter is preferable.
This solution also leaves many of the awkward issues
regarding definition unresolved and cases of oppression that fall
short of clear jus cogens violations indeterminate. Drinan's book
does not help on this point either, and indeed his work tends to
raise substantially more questions than answers. The questions his
work poses, however, are fascinating and important. So, too, is his
lucid application of these queries to some country and regional
studies at the end of the book. Transnational political discourse
has become imbued with religion, and forcing policy makers to at
least recognize the difficult religious dimensions of decisions is an
important goal. In as much as this book endeavors to bring
religion and religious freedom firmly into the international legal
policy arena, Drinan's work is a critical and timely contribution.
120 Note, however, that even if not a separate crime basis, the religious component
could potentially aggravate the seriousness of the charge.
121 See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 277 (2002) (discussing the prosecution of rape as an international war
crime).
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